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106 
BEHIND THE VENIRE: RATIONALE, REWARDS 
AND RAMIFICATIONS OF HEIGHTENED 
SCRUTINY AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
EXTENSION OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO GAYS 
AND LESBIANS DURING JURY SELECTION IN 
SMITHKLINE v. ABBOTT 
Abstract: On January 21, 2014, in SmithKline v. Abbott, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that heightened scrutiny applies to classifi-
cations based on sexual orientation, and equal protection forbids striking ju-
rors because they are gay or lesbian. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Su-
preme Court’s recent analysis in United States v. Windsor as applying height-
ened scrutiny, rather than rational basis review that has historically been used 
to assess issues surrounding sexual orientation. The Ninth Circuit also rea-
soned that given the historical exclusion and pervasive discrimination of gays 
and lesbians, this group requires equal protection. This Comment argues that 
while this ruling in theory represents a victory for equal rights, the practical 
effects could prove minimal and even potentially problematic. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, courts started to utilize 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution to prohibit discrimination against potential jurors because of their 
race or gender.1 In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held in SmithKline v. Abbott that heightened scrutiny applied to classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation and that consequently equal protection 
also prohibited an attorney from striking a would-be juror because he was a 
gay man.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“[No state shall] deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) 
(prohibiting discrimination in the form of peremptory strikes against jurors based on gender); 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (prohibiting discrimination in the form of peremptory 
strikes against jurors based on race). These courts have held that a heightened level of scrutiny 
applies to the classifications of race and gender and that given their historical exclusion from fun-
damental aspects of society coupled with pervasive stereotyping surrounding each group, striking 
jurors based on these classifications violated the Equal Protection Clause. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 
136. 
 2 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014). Although the case dealt with only a gay male juror, the 
opinion indicates that heightened scrutiny and equal protection apply to classifications based on 
sexual orientation in general, and on numerous occasions mentions both gays and lesbians. See id. 
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This Comment discusses why the decision in SmithKline is a landmark 
case for the gay rights movement.3 The extension of heightened scrutiny 
and equal protection to classifications based on sexual orientation ensures 
that gays and lesbians receive equal treatment and the opportunity to influ-
ence important societal decisions by serving as jurors.4 At the same time, 
the decision’s impact may prove limited as applied to juror striking, and 
could even put gay and lesbian jurors in potentially uncomfortable positions 
by exposing and discussing their sexuality.5 Part I of this Comment discuss-
es the history and current status of the law regarding equal protection and 
heightened scrutiny as they apply to jury selection.6 Part II analyzes the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in SmithKline to determine that heightened scruti-
ny and equal protection extend to gays and lesbians.7 Finally, Part III argues 
that this decision could yield both benefits and burdens for gay and lesbian 
jurors and the systems in which they serve, and proposes the total elimina-
tion of peremptory strikes as the most effective means to quash discrimina-
tion against minority groups in jury selection.8  
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY AS APPLIED  
TO JUROR STRIKING 
 Part A of this section will examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s prece-
dent regarding discrimination during the jury selection process based on 
race and gender, respectively.9 Part B of this section will discuss the inex-
plicit level of scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual orientation 
by the Supreme Court in recent decisions.10  
A. The Batson Precedent 
In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
privilege of peremptory challenges in selecting a jury is subject to the guar-
                                                                                                                           
It is worth noting that the opinion does not mention other members of the sexual orientation spec-
trum, including bisexual jurors. See id. 
 3 See id.; infra notes 9–88 and accompanying text. 
 4 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 485. 
 5  See id. at 486–87; see also Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Ninth Circuit, in 
SmithKline v. Abbott Labs, Bars Lawyers From Removing Gay/Lesbian Jurors, UC DAVIS SCHOOL 
OF LAW FACULTY BLOG (Jan. 31, 2014), http://facultyblog.law.ucdavis.edu/post/the-ninth-circuit-in-
smithkline-v-abbott-labs-bars-lawyers-from-removing-gaylesbian-jurors.aspx, archived at http://perma.
cc/U4SJ-575T (noting that objections to peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation could require 
jurors to affirm or deny their membership to an LGBT group). 
 6 See infra notes 9–34 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 35–59 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 60–83 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 11–24 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 25–33 and accompanying text. 
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antees of the Equal Protection Clause.11 A peremptory challenge is a party’s 
ability to strike, or remove, a juror from the venire, or jury pool, with no 
explanation or reason.12 Further, Batson made it constitutionally impermis-
sible to strike a juror based on race.13 
Batson established a three-pronged test to evaluate discrimination in 
jury selection.14 First, the party challenging the peremptory strike must es-
tablish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.15 Second, the strik-
ing party must give a non-discriminatory reason for the strike.16 Third, the 
court must decide whether the challenger has demonstrated purposeful dis-
crimination.17 If all three prongs are satisfied, Equal Protection demands 
that the strike be reversed.18 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 (reaffirming the principle that “‘deliberate denial . . . on account of 
race of participation of jurors in the administration of justice violates the equal protection clause’” 
(quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965))); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1 
(“[No state shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
 12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261–62 (10th ed. 2014) (defining peremptory challenge, also 
referred to as a “peremptory” or “peremptory strike,” as “one of a party’s limited number of chal-
lenges that do not need to be supported by a reason” and venire as “a panel of persons selected for 
jury duty and from among whom the jurors are to be chosen”). Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure governs Jury Selection. See FED. R. CIV. P. 47(c). Jurors can be excused from the 
venire in two primary ways. See id. First, a juror may be excused for good cause, meaning if a 
judge or lawyer can identify any reason that would prevent that juror from being able to weigh 
evidence impartially. See id. Second, a juror can also be excused without cause via a peremptory 
challenge, which entitles each party in a civil case to three peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1870 (2012). Peremptory challenges allow an attorney to strike a juror for nothing more than a 
feeling or, as described by Justice Rehnquist in his Batson dissent, a “seat-of-the-pants instinct.” 
476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The facts in Batson illustrate the power of the peremp-
tory challenge: a black man was indicted with charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of 
stolen goods. Id. at 82 (majority opinion). On the first day of the trial, the judge conducted the voir 
dire (a preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the 
prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on the jury), removed certain jurors for cause, and then 
permitted the attorneys for each side to use their allotted peremptory challenges. See id. at 82–83. 
The prosecutor removed all four black members of the venire, resulting in the selection of an all-
white jury. See id. 
 13 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
 14 Id. at 97–98. 
 15 Id.; see SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476. Generally it is easy to establish a prima facie case. See 
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 (2005) (explaining that the burden on the challenging 
party is not an onerous one and that the trial judge need only draw an inference that discrimination 
had occurred). Challengers make their prima facie case by producing evidence that the prospective 
juror is a member of a cognizable group, that counsel used a peremptory strike against the indi-
vidual, and that the totality of the circumstances raises an inference that the strike was motivated 
by the characteristic in question. See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476. 
 16 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98; SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476. The Court has stated that the 
“non-discriminatory reason” must be a “clear and reasonably specific” explanation of a “legiti-
mate reason” for striking the juror. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 
(1980). 
 17 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98; SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476. Purposeful discrimination was 
easier to establish in Batson, where all of the peremptories used by the prosecutor were against 
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In 1994, in J. E. B. v Alabama ex rel T.B., the Supreme Court expanded 
Batson protection to strikes based on gender.19 The Court set firm limits by 
narrowing the scope of its holding: peremptory strikes are still permissible 
against any group or class of individuals normally subject to ‘rational basis’ 
review.20 
The issue for the Ninth Circuit in SmithKline becomes whether height-
ened scrutiny or rational basis review applies to classifications based on 
sexual orientation.21 Rational basis review is the lowest form of scrutiny 
that courts use to determine a law’s constitutionality and requires only that 
any legislative action be based in some rational governmental interest.22 
                                                                                                                           
black men. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82–83. This prong is harder to prove when only one member 
of a suspect class is on the venire, as in SmithKline. See 740 F.3d at 474. 
 18 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100; SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 479. Because of the influence of the 
Batson decision, courts refer to the act of challenging a discriminatory peremptory strike as a 
“Batson Challenge.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12 at 261–62; see also, e.g., 
Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding a district court’s denial of a “Batson 
Challenge”); United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 671 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding district court’s 
denial of religion-based “Batson Challenge”); Morning v. Zapata Protetin (USA) Inc., 128 F.3d 
213, 216 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that “Batson Challenge” raised after venire was excused was too 
late). Because it was a criminal trial, Batson was initially restricted to these types of peremptory 
challenges that were made by criminal prosecutors. See 476 U.S. at 82–83. In 1991, in Edmonson 
v. Lee Concrete Co., the Supreme Court held that these types of peremptory challenges—those 
which attempted to exclude a juror because of race—were also impermissible in private civil ac-
tions. 500 U.S. 614, 616, 631 (1990). 
 19 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. The Batson inquiry had previously been restricted to race-based 
allegations of discrimination. See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 479. The Court in J.E.B. offered some 
guiding policy reasons for curbing discriminatory peremptory strikes by highlighting the potential 
effects of discrimination on a trifecta of afflicted groups: the litigants, the community and the 
individual jurors. 511 U.S. at 129. The Court further noted: 
The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discrimina-
tory selection of the jury will infect the entire proceeding . . . .The community is 
harmed by the State’s participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereo-
types and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-
sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders . . . . All persons, when grant-
ed the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily 
because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce 
patterns of historical discrimination. 
See id. at 140. 
 20 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143 (noting that parties may still exercise their peremptory challenges to 
remove groups or classes subject to rational basis review). 
 21 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474. 
 22 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Bd. of 
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357 (2001) (holding that only rational basis test 
applies to state actions toward the disabled); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 
(1982) (requiring states to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classifications 
based on gender and thus applying heightened scrutiny). To survive rational basis review and be 
deemed constitutional, the regulation in question need only be “rationally related” to a legitimate 
government interest. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Examples of classifications subject to rational 
basis review are intelligence and physical disability. See id. The Court in Cleburne explains that 
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State actions that classify based on race and gender, however, are subject to 
heightened forms of scrutiny: gender is subject to intermediate scrutiny 
which requires the state action to be substantially related to an important 
government interest, while race is subject to strict scrutiny—the highest 
form—which requires the state action to be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest.23 These two heightened levels of scrutiny 
set a higher bar to meet than the threshold ‘rational basis,’ and therefore it is 
harder to prove that a law is unconstitutional under a rational basis standard 
than either heightened scrutiny standard.24  
B. An Opaque Ruling from the Supreme Court in Windsor Allows for 
Interpretation in SmithKline 
Until 2013, the Ninth Circuit had applied rational basis review to mat-
ters of sexual orientation.25 In 2013, in United States v. Windsor, the Su-
preme Court declared the Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage 
(a legal union between a man and a woman) unconstitutional, implying that 
a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis review applied to classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation.26 The Supreme Court in Windsor did not 
                                                                                                                           
sex, unlike these classifications, usually has no impact on the individual’s ability to perform or 
contribute to society. See id. at 440–41. Therefore, there is no reason for any law to exclude them, 
save prejudice. See id.  
 23 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41. To survive intermediate scrutiny and be deemed consti-
tutional, the regulation in question needs to be substantially related to an important government 
interest. See id. To survive strict scrutiny—the highest bar of constitutional scrutiny—the regula-
tion must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. See id. Courts believe 
that qualities like race and gender have little to no bearing on a legitimate state interest and are 
therefore solely discriminatory in nature. See id.  
 24 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 480–81. 
 25 Id. at 480. Most instances saw the Ninth Circuit apply rational basis review when evaluat-
ing military policies classifying individuals based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of 
Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying rational basis review when a female Air 
Force nurse was suspended because of a relationship with another woman); Philips v. Perry, 106 
F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying rational basis review when Navy service member at-
tempted to prevent his discharge under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” after revealing he was gay); High 
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 674 (9th Cir. 1990) (apply-
ing rational basis review when class action challenged Department of Defense policy of conduct-
ing expanded background checks into gay and lesbian applicants for top-secret security clearanc-
es). 
 26 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“What has been explained to 
this point should more than suffice to establish that the principal purpose and the necessary effect 
of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the 
Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is unconstitutional . . . .”); Ian Bartrum, The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s Treatment of Sexual Orientation: “Defining Rational Basis Review with Bite,” 112 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 142, 146 (2014) (discussing SmithKline, Windsor, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s heightened scrutiny treatment of sexual orientation generally); Brian Soucek, The Return of 
Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 166 (2014) (discussing whether 
Windsor applied the First Circuit’s “rational-basis-with-extra-bite”). But see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
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explicitly require a heightened scrutiny standard when analyzing classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation, but the ambiguity of the ruling provided 
ample room for circuit interpretation.27 
In 2014 in SmithKline v. Abbott, the Ninth Circuit took the opportunity 
to interpret the Supreme Court’s level of scrutiny in Windsor.28 Originating 
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California as an anti-
trust case, SmithKline Beecham Corporation sued Abbott Laboratories for 
alleged abuse of a licensing agreement for an HIV drug in a way that drove 
up prices and simultaneously funneled business to Abbott’s own product.29 
At trial, Abbott used its first peremptory strike to rid the venire of its only 
self-identified gay member.30 SmithKline’s attorney challenged the strike 
under the precedent established in Batson, but was unsuccessful.31 
The appeal presented the Ninth Circuit with two major issues: (1) 
whether heightened scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual ori-
entation and (2) whether, if heightened scrutiny applied, equal protection 
should bar an attorney from making a peremptory strike of a gay or lesbian 
                                                                                                                           
2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out the majority’s failure to draw a “strict-vs.-rational-basis 
scrutiny” distinction and instead relying on due process principles).  
 27 See 133 S. Ct. at 2694; see also Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2014) (hold-
ing Indiana and Wisconsin bans against same-sex marriage unconstitutional even if it is not sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny because the governments have failed to supply even a reasonable ba-
sis). But see DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying rational basis review, 
and not heightened scrutiny, to uphold Michigan’s refusal to acknowledge same-sex marriages). In 
the DeBoer opinion, the Sixth Circuit notes the “light touch” that judges should use in reviewing 
laws under this standard. 772 F.3d at 404. “So long as judges can conceive of some “plausible” 
reason for the law—any plausible reason, and even one that did not motivate the legislators who 
enacted it—the law must stand, no matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise the judges may consider it 
as citizens.” See id.  
 28 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682; SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481. 
 29 SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474. SmithKline argued that Abbott violated the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, the antitrust laws and North Carolina’s Unfair Trade Practices Act. 
Id. The pricing of HIV medications is a matter of significant concern among the gay community. 
See id. The CDC reports that gay and bisexual men were disproportionately affected by HIV than 
any other group in the United States. HIV Among Gay and Bisexual Men, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last visited Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/gender/
msm/facts/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L3FF-VETF. Further, in 2010, gay and bisexual 
men accounted for seventy-eight percent of infections among newly infected men. See id. 
 30 SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474. During jury questioning, the potential juror’s sexual orienta-
tion was allegedly revealed when he referenced his “partner” and then followed up by referring to 
his partner as “he.” Id. 
 31 See id.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 84. In challenging the strike of the only openly gay 
venire member, SmithKline’s attorney argued that equal protection prohibited peremptory strikes 
on the basis of sexual orientation. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474. The district judge denied 
SmithKline’s Batson Challenge to the peremptory strike. Id. The judge provided that she would 
reconsider her decision should Abbott strike another gay man. See id. 
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juror based on their sexual orientation.32 The Ninth Circuit held in the af-
firmative for both of the issues.33 
II. USING WITT TO INTERPRET WINDSOR: APPLYING HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION TO GAYS AND LESBIANS 
SmithKline v. Abbott Laboratories stands for two propositions: that 
heightened scrutiny (as opposed to rational basis review) applies to classifi-
cations based on sexual orientation and, second, that equal protection pro-
hibits peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation in jury selection.34 
Part A of this section will discuss the first point regarding heightened scru-
tiny, while Part B will discuss the second point regarding equal protection.35 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Heightened Scrutiny Conclusion 
Because courts still permit peremptory strikes based on classifications 
that are subject to rational basis review, the degree of scrutiny applied to 
classifications based on sexual orientation is crucial.36 In SmithKline, the 
Ninth Circuit analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor to determine what level of scrutiny applies.37 The Ninth Circuit 
used its own test from a 2008 case, Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, to deter-
mine that the Supreme Court used heightened scrutiny when considering the 
DOMA question in Windsor.38 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Lab., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014); infra 
notes 36–57 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 36–57 and accompanying text. 
 36 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 480; supra note 12 and accompanying text (defining perempto-
ry strike); supra note 22 and accompanying text (defining rational basis review).  
 37 SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481; supra note 23 and accompanying text (defining the different 
levels of scrutiny); see also Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of “Windsor scrutiny”).  
 38 SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474; Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 810–11 (9th Cir. 
2008). In Witt, a female Air Force reservist was suspended from duty because of her sexual rela-
tionship with another woman. 537 F.3d at 809. She brought due process and equal protection chal-
lenges. Id. The Ninth Circuit used the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas and con-
cluded that because Lawrence relied only on substantive due process and not on equal protection, 
it affected substantive due process cases, but not equal protection rules. See id. at 822; see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit began applying 
heightened scrutiny to due processes issues but continued to apply rational basis review to equal 
protection cases. See SmithKline 740 F.3d at 480. What Judge Reinhardt in SmithKline takes from 
Witt, however, is the strategy for interpreting what level of scrutiny the Supreme Court used when 
analyzing matters of sexual orientation, when they have not explicitly stated the level. See id. In 
other words, Witt gives a method for inferring the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court deems 
appropriate. See id.; Witt, 527 F.3d at 809. 
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In 2008, in Witt, the Ninth Circuit established a three-part test to dis-
cern the level of scrutiny used by the Supreme Court when the Court is not 
explicit.39 The first prong asks whether the Supreme Court considered post-
hoc rationalizations (or the actual purposes for) the law in question.40 The 
second prong asks whether or not there is a legitimate state interest to justify 
the harm that the law might cause.41 The final prong requires an investiga-
tion into the cases cited in the opinion, and whether they applied the height-
ened scrutiny or rational basis test.42  
Applying the three-part test in Witt, the Ninth Circuit in SmithKline 
held that the scrutiny deployed in Windsor was indeed heightened scruti-
ny.43 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the first part of this test was satisfied 
because of the Windsor opinion’s extensive consideration of the actual pur-
poses of DOMA.44 Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the second 
prong of the test was satisfied because the Court focused heavily on the bal-
ancing of the state’s interest in DOMA and the harm imposed on gays and 
lesbians.45 According to the Ninth Circuit, this balancing indicated some-
thing more than rational basis, since it suggested a more rigorous analysis 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 480. 
 40 See id. The Windsor opinion devotes many pages to detailing the actual purposes of DO-
MA, which indicates that the Court was employing a heightened level of scrutiny. See United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). The Supreme Court in Windsor quoted exten-
sively from the legislative history of DOMA, including the House Report, in an effort unveil the 
design, purpose and effect or the “essence” of the law. Id. Typically, under a rational basis of 
review, the Court may analyze the hypothetical reasons for a law. See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 
481. In Windsor, the Court went beyond hypothetical reasons and looked at Congress’s “avowed 
purpose,” which it determined was to protect marriage from the immorality of homosexuality. See 
133 S. Ct. at 2693. Thus, the Court’s analysis in Windsor is beyond that of rational basis review. 
See id. 
 41 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 480. 
 42 See id. at 483. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. at 482. 
 45 See id. at 480. Whereas rational basis review typically is unconcerned with inequality that 
results from a state action, heightened scrutiny is evidenced by a balancing of the inequality and 
the state interest. Id. at 482. In Windsor, the Court spent considerable time weighing this balance. 
Id.; see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. As the SmithKline opinion notes, the words “harm” or 
“injury” do not typically appear in court decisions applying rational basis review. 740 F.3d at 482. 
The court in Windsor, however, used these words repeatedly, and considered the “effect” of DO-
MA eight times. Id. Additionally, Windsor discusses the “resulting injury and indignity” and the 
“disadvantage” to gays and lesbians as a result of the law. 133 S. Ct. at 2681. In the eyes of the 
Court, these considerations signaled a heightened scrutiny that went beyond traditional rational 
basis. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 482. Professors Amar and Brownstein argue that in some circum-
stances, insistence on “legitimate” purposes for upholding a law is consistent with an application 
of rational basis review, rather than heightened scrutiny. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5. The 
professors argue that “legitimate” applies to all standards of review and that any law that is 
deemed “illegitimate” may undermine the validity of the law, but outside of a scrutiny analysis. 
See id. Typically with intermediate-level scrutiny or strict scrutiny, an “important” or “compel-
ling” state interest is required. See id. 
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of harm to the group than would be required under rational basis.46 Thus, 
part two of the test was satisfied.47 Finally, the Ninth Circuit found the third 
prong to be the least important factor because Windsor relied on two cases 
that apply heightened scrutiny, but also on one case that applied rational 
basis.48 The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that, although the last factor 
does not strongly sway one way or the other, Windsor scrutiny had required 
more than the traditional rational basis review.49 
B. Expanding Batson to Extend Equal Protection to Gays and Lesbians 
 After determining that heightened scrutiny applied, the second fun-
damental question in SmithKline dealt with whether or not Batson-type 
strikes should be expanded to include sexual orientation.50 
The Court drew on policy reasoning established in J. E. B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. T.B., which extended the holding in Batson v. Kentucky to include 
discrimination against women.51 Two primary factors animated the argu-
ment in SmithKline in favor of bolstering protection: (1) the historical ex-
clusion of gays and lesbians from democratic institutions; and (2) the perva-
siveness of stereotypes surrounding the group.52 Both of these factors also 
applied to women in J. E. B.53 
The SmithKline opinion fleshed out the history of discrimination 
against gays and lesbians in the past century and today.54 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. Perhaps these analytic leaps of faith reflect SmithKline author Judge Stephen Rein-
hardt’s reputation for progressive decisions. See Ward Farnsworth, Note, The Role of Law in 
Close Cases: Some Evidence from the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1083, 1090 
(2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has reversed Reinhardt’s decisions with frequency unparal-
leled by most other Circuit Court judges).  
 50 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474. 
 51 See id. at 484; supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the Batson holding); supra 
note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in J.E.B.).  
 52 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484. 
 53 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136–37 (1994). The opinion in J.E.B. 
focused on the long historical exclusion of women in the legal and democratic processes: women 
could not hold office, vote, bring suits in their own name, or serve on, let alone be struck from, 
juries. See id. The Court asserted that allowing peremptory strikes based on gender perpetuates the 
invidious archaic stereotypes that explained this historical exclusion. Id. 
 54 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484–85. Gays and lesbians have faced discrimination in the 
realms of employment, immigration and military service, among others. See id. The present battle 
for marriage equality represents the level of legal discrimination that still persists in many states. 
See Winning the Freedom to Marry, Progress in the States, FREEDOM TO MARRY (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/, archived at http://perma.cc/JL5P-2ZQM. A handful of 
states still have laws or constitutional amendments that deny same-sex couples the right to marry. 
See id. The Supreme Court will take on this issue in 2015. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court 
Agrees to hear Gay Marriage Issue, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015) http://www.washington
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maintained that allowing strikes based on sexual orientation would perpetu-
ate the stereotypes frequently associated with gays and lesbians.55 Permit-
ting strikes based on sexual orientation would reinforce these stereotypes 
and send a message to the public that gays and lesbians cannot adequately 
fulfill their civic duty as jurors.56 The combination of historical exclusion 
and invidious stereotypes shaped the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
that there was a serious need to protect the rights of gay and lesbian ju-
rors.57 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN SMITHKLINE: PROS, CONS, AND  
AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION 
 This Section argues that although the precedent set in SmithKline 
theoretically has the positive effect of ensuring gay and lesbian access to the 
jury system, it could introduce privacy issues and ultimately fall short of 
eliminating discrimination via the peremptory strike.58 Part A of this section 
                                                                                                                           
post.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-gay-marriage-issue/2015/01/16/86514
9ec-9d96-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SG26-RHMN. 
 55 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 486; see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 
982–83 (N.D. Cal. 2010) aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“Well-known stereotypes 
about gay men and lesbians include a belief that gays and lesbians are affluent, self-absorbed and 
incapable of forming long-term intimate relationships. Other stereotypes imagine gay men and 
lesbians as disease vectors or as child molesters who recruit young children into homosexuality. 
No evidence supports these stereotypes.”); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The 
New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 829 (2014) (“For the better part of a 
century, stereotyped conceptions of homosexuals (particularly gay men) depicted them as sexually 
predatory, dangerous to children and antithetical to the family.”). 
 56 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 486. 
 57 See id. The Court eloquently iterated the important policy arguments in favor of this move 
in the opinion:  
Strikes exercised on the basis of sexual orientation continue this deplorable tradition 
of treating gays and lesbians as undeserving of participation in our nation’s most 
cherished rites and rituals. They tell the individual who has been struck, the litigants, 
other members of the venire, and the public that our judicial system treats gays and 
lesbians differently. They deprive individuals of the opportunity to participate in 
perfecting democracy and guarding our ideals of justice on account of a characteris-
tic that has nothing to do with their fitness to serve.  
Id. at 475. 
 58 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486–87 (9th Cir. 2014) (urging 
caution in extending Batson strikes to sexual orientation “in light of significant sensitivities and 
privacy interests at stake”). In SmithKline, the Ninth Circuit cited a California state court opinion 
that noted that “No one should be ‘outed’ in order to take part in the civic enterprise which is jury 
duty.” See id. (citing People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 347 (2000). Nonetheless, the Ninth 
Circuit reaffirmed that the challenges posed by extending Batson to sexual orientation should not 
sway the court to allow these types of peremptory strikes. See id. at 487. Furthermore, “prudent 
courtroom procedures” that already exist to address sensitive topics will alleviate the concerns. 
See id. 
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describes why applying heightened scrutiny to issues surrounding discrimi-
nation against gays and lesbians in jury selection is essential to safeguard 
their voice from being silenced.59 Part B of this section highlights the priva-
cy issues that challenging a strike based on sexual orientation might engen-
der. 60 Finally, Part C of this section proposes an alternative solution: to 
eliminate the peremptory strike altogether in order to more effectively pre-
clude nefarious attorneys from using them to further discriminatory agen-
das.61  
A. The Numerical Necessity of Heightened Scrutiny for Gay and Lesbian 
Representation on Juries 
Applying heightened scrutiny to questions of sexual orientation is crit-
ical (at least in the context of jury selection) because of the numerical im-
balance between straight people and non-straight people.62 The impact of 
striking gays and lesbians from a venire can be profound because gays and 
lesbians, like blacks and other non-white races, are outnumbered minorities 
without a numerically equal counterpart (as men are to women, and vice 
versa).63 Unlike with gender, these groups are not subject to what academics 
call the “neutralizing effect.”64 The neutralizing effect occurs when oppos-
ing peremptory challenges neutralize equally represented sides, leaving the 
venire with roughly the same amount on either side.65 With gender, the the-
ory works perfectly: the attorney for one side eliminates as many women as 
she can while the attorney for the opposing side eliminates as many men as 
she can, leaving the venire with roughly the same number of men and wom-
                                                                                                                           
 59 See infra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 77–88 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5 (discussing the minority status of gays and lesbians 
that facilitates their complete eradication from the venire).  
 63 See id.; Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 369, 370 (1992). Professor Broderick argues that the peremptory challenge is “ha-
bitually employed to discriminate against citizens on the basis of invidious and atavistic classifica-
tions” and “subverts the representativeness” of the jury by removing minorities. See Broderick, 
supra. In particular, Broderick recognizes that historically all blacks called for jury duty could be 
“easily precluded from reaching the jury box” by means of the peremptory challenge. See id. at 
384.  
 64 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5. 
 65 See id.; Brian A. Howie, A Remedy Without a Wrong: J.E.B. and the Extension of Batson to 
Sex-Based Peremptory Challenges, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1752 (1995) (noting that since 
men and women represent roughly half the population, the venire will reflect that amount and both 
sides will be equally subjected to peremptory challenge from either side and thus the system as a 
whole does not treat each side differently). 
2015] Extension of Equal Protection to Gays and Lesbians in Jury Selection 117 
en.66 Thus the neutralizing effect has evened out the playing field and in 
theory neither gender is numerically prejudiced by the peremptory strikes.67 
Because gays and lesbians represent a minority group, they do not 
have the theoretical benefit of the neutralizing effect.68 Considering societal 
percentages reflected in the jury pool, the attorney for one side could use 
peremptory strikes to eliminate all the gays and lesbians from the venire 
with ease, resulting in an entirely straight jury and the stark absence of any 
gay or lesbian voice.69 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 
127, 159 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the jury selection 
process did not discriminate against women because each side struck both sexes in equal numbers 
and is thus “evenhanded”: for each man struck by the government, the petitioner’s lawyer struck a 
woman. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 159. Justice Scalia went on to explain that this pattern does not 
display systemic sex-based discrimination, but rather each party’s desire to achieve a favorable 
jury for their side. See id.; see also Howie, supra note 65, at 1752 (explaining that J.E.B. provides 
evidence that the system does not classify between men and women in that both sides struck both 
men and women in “almost identical proportions”). This assumes the split was fifty-fifty to begin 
with, which may not always be the case. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 159. 
 67 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5; see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. In J.E.B., the state 
used nine out of ten peremptories to remove male jurors, while the petitioner used all but one 
peremptory to remove female jurors. 511 U.S. at 129. Nevertheless, due to a disproportionate 
amount of women venire members, the resulting jury was all female. See Howie, supra note 65, at 
1752 (crediting the all-female empanelment in J.E.B. to the “luck of the jury panel draw”).  
 68 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5; Kathryne M. Young, Outing Batson: How the Case 
of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 243, 251 
(2011). Young describes the silencing effect of not applying Batson protection to gays and lesbi-
ans: “the side opposing a gay litigant is empowered to dismiss the jurors (gays and lesbians) who 
might most effectively guard against anti-gay arguments behind the jury room's closed doors.” See 
Young, supra, at 251; see also Paul R. Lynd, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section 
Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 231, 239 
(1998) (providing the example of the trial for the gay-bashing killing of John O’Connel in San 
Francisco in 1985, in which defense counsel sought to identify all gay and lesbian jurors in order 
to systematically exclude them). The same is true for racial minorities. See Amar & Brownstein, 
supra note 5. Professors Amar and Brownstein explain using a numerical example. Id. If a juris-
diction is comprised of seventy-five percent whites and twenty-five percent racial minorities, the 
jury pool will often roughly reflect those percentages. See id. So, a proportional drawing of twelve 
would-be jurors would contain nine whites and three non-whites. See id. If each side is allotted 
three peremptory strikes, each side could begin aggressively removing people based on race and 
the result would be the elimination of all the non-whites from the venire, leaving seven white 
people. See id. Assuming the now empty spots are filled evenly again to reflect the demographic 
percentages of the community, we add 1.5 non-whites and 4.5 whites, bringing out totals to 10.5 
whites and 1.5 non-whites going into the trial. See id. This is clearly a very calculated example, 
but can serve to reflect the type of systemic issue that discriminatory peremptory strikes can have 
on minority groups and their representations on juries. See id. 
 69 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5; see also Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: 
Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 707, 755 (1993) (arguing that eliminating peremptory strikes could solve the problem of 
litigants disproportionately excluding minority venire members and thereby produce a more heter-
ogeneous jury).  
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B. When the Jury Is Not Out: Potential Drawbacks to Heightened Scrutiny 
and Equal Protection 
Although the opinion in SmithKline signifies a jurisprudential victory 
for the gay rights movement, the reality of courtroom practice will prove 
that this decision provides little protection against discrimination.70 The key 
distinction between this case and Batson v. Kentucky and J. E. B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel. T.B. is that unlike those cases in which the would-be juror’s 
classification (as an African-American or a woman, respectively) is usually 
perceptible, sexual orientation is not a characteristic that can always be easi-
ly identified.71 In fact, a juror’s classification as gay or lesbian is typically 
unrecognizable unless the person reveals it, either explicitly or inferentially, 
as happened in SmithKline.72 
The often hidden nature of sexual orientation presents some problems 
with regard to discrimination claims. 73 First, in order for an attorney to 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 486; see also David Herr & Steve Baicker-McKee, Jury Tri-
als—Batson Analysis, 29 FED. LITIGATOR, Mar. 2014, at 17, 17. In the “litigation tips” section of 
this brief review of the SmithKline decision, the authors note that the attorney using the perempto-
ry strike failed to articulate any non-discriminatory reason for the strike. Herr & Baicker-McKee, 
supra, at 17. This suggests that attorneys wishing to discriminate based on sexual orientation need 
only prepare a non-discriminatory reason to circumvent this problem. See id.; Young, supra note 
68, at 245. Young argues that while the case for extending Batson protection to gays and lesbians 
is strong and would be an improvement on the current absence of protection, it would be “glaring-
ly inadequate” to protect jurors’ equal protection rights. Young, supra note 68, at 261. Young 
warns that in practice it would raise problems and “ultimately prove unfaithful to the Batson 
court’s vision,” and describes how the process of questioning jurors about LGBT identity could 
prove “absurd and insulting.” See id. at 258; see also Giovanna Shay, In the Box: Voir Dire on 
LGBT Issues in Changing Times, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 407, 452 (2014) (discussing practical 
issues). 
 71 Supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the Batson holding); supra note 19 and 
accompanying text (discussing the holding in J.E.B.); see also, Shay, supra note 70, at 452 (noting 
that Batson challenges based on sexual orientation pose practical issues since a prospective juror’s 
sexual orientation or transgender status, unlike race, are not included on the jury questionnaire). 
Shay also discusses the issue of whether a striking attorney discriminated against prospective 
jurors because of their membership to a LGBT group or because of a perception that the juror is 
LGBT. See Shay, supra note 70, at 452; see also Todd Brower, Twelve Angry—and Sometimes 
Alienated—Men: The Experiences and Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men During Jury Service, 
59 DRAKE L. REV. 669, 680 (2011) (describing the “hidden identity” of sexual minorities, how it 
is typically unidentifiable “visually, by accent, or surname, and how many heterosexuals cannot 
identify gay men or lesbians who do not disclose their sexual orientation); Lynd, supra note 68, at 
267 (noting that classification by sexual orientation is an uncertain, subjective assessment, and 
that even the jurors themselves may be unsure about their precise sexual orientation); Young, 
supra note 68, at 255 (whereas race and gender are sometimes readily apparent, gays and lesbians 
are forced to choose whether or not to disclose their sexual identity, a concealable characteristic).  
 72 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474. The juror in SmithKline referred to his “partner” multiple 
times and used the pronoun “he” during the voir dire. Id. The juror never explicitly told the judge 
or the attorney for either side that he was a gay man. See id. 
 73 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5. Professors Amar and Brownstein note that it is hard 
enough to show discrimination when the juror’s membership to the class is obvious. See id. It is 
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make a discriminatory peremptory strike based on sexual orientation, he or 
she would have to know (or presume to know) that person’s sexual orienta-
tion.74 Therefore, it would be necessary to tease this information out of the 
jurors through questioning that would likely be uncomfortable, especially 
for jurors who do not wish to expose their sexual orientation to the court.75 
Second, a Batson Challenge against one of these discriminatory strikes 
could invite a barrage of inquiries that could thrust a juror’s sexuality into 
the center of a court hearing.76 
                                                                                                                           
not an easy task for even a skilled litigator to prove that the opposing counsel struck a black per-
son because she was black or a woman because she was a woman, and these are characteristics 
that are outwardly apparent. See id. But see Anna N. Martinez, Striking Jurors Based on Sexual 
Orientation Is Discriminatory, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 74 (2014), http://www.denverlaw
review.org/online-articles/2014/4/10/striking-jurors-based-on-sexual-orientation-is-discriminator.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/UPM8-KLB3. In outlining the effects of the SmithKline deci-
sion, Martinez asserts that jurors need not “out” themselves, but rather a Batson Challenge could 
be raised “where the constellation of information from juror questionnaires and voir dire permits 
the parties to adduce the juror’s classification.” Martinez, supra, at 74. 
 74 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476. Batson precedent requires that the party challenging the 
peremptory strike establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. See id. The adjective 
“intentional” presupposes knowledge of the juror’s class membership on the part of the attorney 
employing the discriminatory strike. See id. This is axiomatic for race and gender, but not always 
so for sexual orientation. See id; Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5. 
 75 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5. On the other hand, the decision in SmithKline could 
have the opposite effect. See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476. It may incentivize attorneys to refrain from 
asking any sexual orientation-related questions, so as to preserve the ability to strike a juror without 
appearing to do so for discriminatory reasons. See id. One loophole in the discriminatory peremptory 
protections is the ease with which an attorney can fabricate a non-discriminatory reason for the strike. 
See Adam Liptak, Court to Decide if Lawyers Can Block Gays from Juries, N.Y. TIMES SIDEBAR 
(July 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/court-weighs-exclusion-of-jurors-because-
theyre-gay.html?src=xps, archived at https://perma.cc/YL5T-C8H3?type=pdf. In SmithKline, the 
attorney for Abbott made the faulty step of failing to provide another reason for striking the gay 
juror. See 740 F.3d at 475. For example, the fact that the juror previously worked at the Ninth 
Circuit or that he had friends who were afflicted with HIV/AIDS were reasonable grounds for 
striking the juror. See id. Justice Marshall expressed his discomfort with this issue in his Batson 
concurrence, stating that if an attorney can so easily generate a non-racial explanation for the 
strike, the Court’s protection might prove “illusory.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
 76 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 486–87. This could be avoided by careful regulation and judi-
cial intervention, however. See id. California has had a law banning discrimination against gays 
and lesbians in jury selection since 2001. CAL. CODE CIV. P. 231.5 (“A party may not use a per-
emptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of an assumption that the prospec-
tive juror is biased merely because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, sexual 
orientation, or similar grounds.”); see also People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 339, 347 (2000) 
(making clear that “no one can be excluded because of sexual orientation . . . [and] no one should 
be allowed to inquire about it”). The court in Garcia further noted: “If it comes out somehow, as it 
did here, the parties will doubtless factor it into their jury selection decisions, just as they factor in 
occupation, education, body language, and whether the juror resembles their stupid Uncle Cletus. 
But there is no reason to allow inquiry about it.” 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 347. 
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C. A Preferable Solution: Eliminating Peremptory Strikes Completely 
Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Batson advocates a more radical and 
effective solution: eliminate peremptory strikes completely.77 His opinion 
questions an attorney’s right to cut a juror by using an “arbitrary and capri-
cious species of [a] challenge,” which has traditionally been a hallmark of 
the American jury selection process.78 There is no constitutional right to 
peremptory challenges, and the Supreme Court has reiterated the fact that 
withholding them does not impair a person’s right to an impartial jury and a 
fair trial.79 Striking the peremptory challenge would theoretically have no 
significant effect on the formation of the venire, because the attorney still 
has the option to excuse a juror by bringing a challenge for cause.80 The 
attorney need only explain her reasoning as to why that juror would be unfit 
to weigh evidence impartially.81 
Furthermore, growing evidence indicates that the Batson method of pre-
venting discriminatory peremptory challenges is ineffective, leading some to 
believe that disposing of them may be the only way to truly quell discrimina-
tion.82 In 2005, in Miller-El v. Dretke, Justice Breyer’s concurrence outlined 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring). Although recognizing the “his-
toric step towards eliminating the shameful practice” of racial discrimination in jury selection 
achieved in Batson, Justice Marshall nonetheless declares in his concurrence: “The inherent poten-
tial of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on 
racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice sys-
tem.” See id. at 106.  
 78 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *346). 
 79 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring); see, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948); United States v. 
Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919); see also 
Broderick, supra note 63 (asserting that peremptory strikes are “not a privilege of constitutional 
dimension,” despite its reputation as a “vital” part of the impartial jury system).  
 80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 47(c); see also Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have 
Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 503 (1996). 
Professor Melilli argues that peremptory challenges largely have served as excuses for inadequate 
functioning of the challenge for cause and an opportunity to employ ugly group stereotypes. See 
Melilli, supra, at 503. He compares the lawyer using peremptory challenges to “a child in a candy 
store with a pocketful of change and a commitment to leave the store without any cash.” Id. 
 81 See Melilli, supra note 80, at 503.  
 82 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–04 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall’s concurrence 
highlights a number of cases in which the striking of black jurors is “both common and flagrant.” 
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1975); McKinney v. Walker, 394 
F. Supp. 1015, 1017–18 (D.S.C. 1974); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1282 
(E.D. La. 1974). One of the most egregious examples was a cite to a prosecutor’s instruction book 
used in Dallas County, Texas that instructed prosecutors to eliminate “any member of a minority 
group,” including “Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans . . . no matter how rich or how well educat-
ed.” See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–04. The book was effective: between 1983 and 1984, prosecu-
tors in the county used peremptory strikes on 405 of 467 eligible black jurors, reducing the odds of 
a black person sitting on a jury to one in ten, versus one in two for a white person (quoting DALL. 
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the holes in the Batson process.83 Namely, Justice Breyer asserts that attor-
neys are free to use strikes that fall below Batson’s prima facie discrimination 
requirement, that they can easily tender a non-discriminatory reason for the 
strike, and that it requires judges to engage in awkward and fruitless question-
ing to find discrimination that could be invisible to the judge and even the 
attorney.84 
Studies echo Justice Breyer’s concerns.85 A survey conducted around 
the same time as the Miller-El decision revealed that of 113 Federal Appel-
late cases reviewing race-neutral explanations under Batson, the courts 
found the allegedly non-race-based explanation proffered by the attorney 
sufficient in 109, or ninety-six percent, of the cases.86 Other studies confirm 
this statistic and reiterate the critique that Batson fails to create any substan-
tial hurdle for attorneys intending to discriminate during jury selection, not 
to mention those who discriminate unknowingly because of unintentional 
biases.87 Moreover, surveys that tracked the opinions of practicing attorneys 
revealed that many believe that Batson challenges prove futile in preventing 
discrimination.88 
                                                                                                                           
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986). See id. But see Jeb C. Griebat, Peremptory Challenge by Blind 
Questionnaire: The Most Practical Solution to Ending the Problem of Racial and Gender Dis-
crimination in Kansas Courts While Preserving the Necessary Function of the Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 12 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 324 (2013). Professor Griebat agrees that Batson chal-
lenges have proven inadequate, easy to circumvent and are only a “watered down version” of a 
challenge for cause. See Griebat, supra, at 324. However, he argues that instead of eliminating 
peremptory challenges, states should require them to be made by use of a blind questionnaire to 
reduce gender or racial biases. See id.  
 83 See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 272. 
 84 See id. Justice Breyer also highlighted the juror grading systems that pervade modern trial 
preparation, assigning and deducting points to jurors based on their demographic characteristics in 
order to collect friends and weed out enemies. See id. As a final point, Justice Breyer cites Eng-
land’s success at holding fair trials without peremptory challenges. Id. 
 85 See Eric N. Einhorn, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is the Per-
emptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L. REV. 161, 189 (1994); Jean Montoya, The Future 
of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremp-
tory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1009 (1996).  
 86 Einhorn, supra note 85, at 189. These courts allowed both objective and subjective expla-
nations that relate to a variety of factors, some of which are vague: employment, education, age, 
housing, marital status, crimes, employment of relatives, appearance, language skills, eye contact, 
intuition and attentiveness. See id. at 189–94; see also Griebat, supra note 82, at 332 (polling 
thirty-five cases from the Kansas Supreme and Appellate courts, in which only four Batson chal-
lenges succeeded).  
 87 Montoya, supra note 85, at 1009 (highlighting results of 1994 survey of trial lawyers indi-
cating that while Batson precedent may have helped educate responsible attorneys about risks of 
discrimination during jury selection, it does little to thwart lawyers intending to discriminate, still 
less for those who do so unconsciously).  
 88 See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The SmithKline decision should be heralded as a victory for fairness 
and equality. The extension of heightened scrutiny and equal protection to 
matters of sexual orientation represents a tremendous step for the courts in 
the quest to provide an inclusive environment for all people. Furthermore, 
the protection that SmithKline provides for gay and lesbian jurors in particu-
lar is paramount for ensuring that the jury room hears these voices. Never-
theless, practical issues of demonstrating discrimination, identifying sexual 
orientation, and potentially “outing” jurors temper the victory. Peremptory 
strikes provide the ammunition in a loaded weapon against which Batson 
armor has proven inadequate. Abolishing the peremptory strike—and the 
venire discrimination it perpetuates—would be the most effective way to 
advance the march towards equal rights in the jury-selection system. 
JAMES LOBO 
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